A MAPPING OF YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA

November 2018

This study was mandated by Open Society Foundations and conducted by Social Change Factory in collaboration with BroadImpact and Partners for Peace.

Open Society Foundations (OSF) is a network of organizations working to build vibrant and tolerant societies whose governments are accountable and open to the participation of all people. OSF seeks to strengthen the rule of law; respect for human rights, minorities, and a diversity of opinions; democratically elected governments; and a civil society that helps keep government power in check.

Social Change Factory (SCF) is an African Civic Leadership Center founded in 2014, headquartered in Dakar (Senegal), working to create a new generation of citizens: engaged, empowered and equipped with the relevant skills to live and lead in a context of rapid change and complex local, national and global issues.

BroadImpact (BI) is an international development business management consulting and advisory organization specializing in providing strategic advisory and consulting services for international development and business needs.

Partners for Peace (P4P) is a peacebuilding network supported by the Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) through self-through facilitation, data analysis, small grants, and capacity building. whose mission is to build social capital around peacebuilding amplifying the voices of positive actors, building a network of identified agents of peace, and leveraging that network through facilitation, data analysis, small grants, and capacity building.

EDITORS: Koly Fall, Daniel Leibovitz, Valérie Colas

TRANSLATOR: Anne-Marie Befoune

COLLABORATORS: Nkasi Wodu, Seun Aladesanmi

Modern Africa

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIPPA: Access to Information Public Protection Act in Zimbabwe
BI: Broad Impact
CVI: Country Vulnerability Index
CODESRIA: Community for Development of Social Sciences Research in Africa
FGD: Focus Groups Discussions
P4P: Partners for Peace
NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations
OSC: Civil Society Organizations
OSF: Open Society Foundations
POSA: Public Order and Security Act
SCF: Social Change Factory
SNA: Stakeholder Network Analysis

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the course of the last decade, there has been growth in the number of youth organizations in Africa while, simultaneously, youth organizations have come to play an important role in the activism behind community development. Knowing that Africa's population is, by some standards, the youngest in the world and growing rapidly (Ashford, 2007), we expect to see parallel growth in the number, scope and impact of youth organizations.

In this document, we have collected the results of a research & mapping exercise on Africa's youth organizations with the objective of better understanding who they are, how they operate, what motivates them and how they collaborate with one another & with other key actors/beneficiaries.

Our procedure can be distilled to the following four-step approach:
1) **Identification**: 30 participating countries were selected by using criteria that would ensure active organizations are reached and that there be a diversity of representation in the organizations.
2) **Data collection**: As part of this phase, Partners for Peace conducted an in-depth Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA) and developed a Country Vulnerability Index (CVI). The CVI provides a snapshot of structural vulnerabilities and pressures within and between Africa's 54 countries. The Index offers this snapshot both for each country as a whole and for how these vulnerabilities and pressures affect youth specifically. While the SNA provide analysts with a better understanding of the organizations working on youth issues across Africa and how those organizations are connected, both to each other and to organizations that are geographically or thematically separate.
3) **Online mapping**: This phase encompassed the creation, by BroadImpact, of a public online youth movement platform to aggregate, interact with and visualize data relative to Youth Organizations in Africa and information relative to this project. The platform is available on http://www.africayouthactivism.org/. (c.f., Appendix: The Design and Development of an Online Interactive Youth Platform for Open Society Foundation).
4) **Reporting phase**: This phase culminates in the following report, prepared by Social Change Factory, accompanied by infographics representing the current state of youth organizations in the countries surveyed.

Our research revealed that Youth Organizations are themselves young in age, with the majority of surveyed organizations having been founded within the last ten years. Their representatives were largely people under the age of 35, with higher male than female representation (Figure 3).

Another key aspect of this study involves the recognition of organizations by their governments through the granting of official status. It was found that most youth entities are legally registered and recognized by their respective authorities. However, those that aren't are often faced with greater challenges (e.g., securing funding from international organizations). Most organizations affirm that their work is facilitated by supportive legislation in their countries.

When asked about their purpose, youth organizations across the continent refer to the immediate needs of their communities in a variety of sectors, such as health, education, economics, etc. The finances of these youth organizations are frequently precarious; it was found that 50% operate on budgets of $7,000 or less (Figure 9). As was expected, social media, digital technologies and mobile technologies were found to be main channels and means of communication for nearly 100% of youth organizations (Figure 14).

As a result of the various findings of this study, we have formulated recommendations directed towards Open Society Foundations, National Governments and International Institutions and Communities, and Youth Organizations.

INTRODUCTION

The Rise of Youth Organizations

Over the course of the last few decades in Africa, a series of seismic social events have had critical consequences on youth (CODESRIA, 2014). These changes have led to the creation of spaces for civic engagement and community empowerment with organizations rising and organizing across communities and nations - at subnational, national and transnational levels.

Whether it be the surge of democratisation, decentralization, privatization and liberalization in the post-colonial era of the 80s, or the democratic breakdowns (Mayol, 2011) and continued stance of autocratic regimes and single-party politics of the 90s and 2000s, the generalized social, political and economic asphyxiation of the population has allowed for youth organizations to develop as a pathway to exercising rights, to advocating on issues, and a platform for sharing thoughts, perspectives and aspirations to governments and institutions.

Several recent and well-publicized youth-led or youth-involved organizations have been – to name a few - the Arab Spring, the youth-led La Lucha organization in Congo, and Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso. Each of these organizations has emerged alongside the widespread increased use of private and social media platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter).

These organizations speak to the hardships related to the high cost of living, to unemployment and to the inadequacy of regimes in power to address these challenges (Dalberto, 2011). They demand that youth be recognized, respected and included at the political, economic and social levels (Dalberto, pp.15). With 60% of the population in Africa being under the age of 30 (AFIDEP, 2017) - and with the youth population projected to continue to grow rapidly in the coming decades - youth and youth organizations make up a force to be reckoned with.

What is a Youth Organization?

We define social organizations as any collective action in favour of a material or moral cause and aimed at reforming an existing political or social order. This definition sets social organizations apart from government- or industry-serving initiatives. We define youth organizations as a subset of social organizations and as intrinsically relating to youth, having been either created by them, for them, or both.

This definition of youth organizations is blurred slightly by the problem of official recognition; of the youth organizations we have surveyed, some are already recognized by their governments, some lack any formal recognition, while others do not seek recognition for strategic reasons (c.f. page 12). For the purposes of broad inclusion, we have not considered any registration requirements in our surveying.

Our youth organizations' stated purposes have precipitated broadly into the following categories: political, health, social, economic, education, religion, environmental, cultural. Depending on the contexts they stem from, these organizations can be classified as Non-profits, NGOs, organizations, and/or networks, with relevant definitions below:
:
Non-profit: Non-profit Organizations (NPOs) are non-publicly funded entities which do not provide a financial return to either owners or stakeholders in their corporation.
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations are entities founded by (a) person(s) with no government posting, and run without oversight from government entities. NGOs nonetheless receive government funding.
Movement: A decentralized collection of people seeking change through grassroots action. A movement is not associated with or funded by government, and may have no recognizable leader.
Network: Any cooperative relationship between 2 or more NPOs, NGOs, and/or movements.

<u>The Study</u>

The Open Society Foundations in partnership with Social Change Factory, Partners for Peace and BroadImpact, undertook this study of youth organizations in Africa in order to better understand how youth organizations operate and effect change. The study proceeded with the following shared objectives in mind: identifying and profiling youth organizations in Africa; identifying how youth organizations operate, their successes, their challenges and weakness; and identifying how youth organizations interact with each other and with government institutions.

Each partner organization was tasked with surveying a set of countries as well as undertake additional initiatives to achieve the objectives of the project. BI was tasked with developing an online mapping tool showing visualisation of youth map information. P4P conducted a Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA) and the mapping of a socio-political context by developing a Country Vulnerability Index. SCF was charged with creating infographic charts for countries surveyed and the following report on the mapping of youth organizations in Africa, building on the products of BI and P4P.

As mentioned above, an important part of the mapping of youth organizations in 30 African countries included the development of an interactive online platform and dashboard developed by BroadImpact Consulting. The online platform was designed to receive data uploads on youth organizations, provide basic visual details of each youth organization and data export functions. The platform was used to collect and aggregate all information and data collected from youth group administered questionnaires, focus group discussions and other responses by all partners during the youth mapping process.

Participants: OSF selected 30 countries based on two qualitative criteria. First, countries were considered on the basis of their strong culture of activism/youth activism. Second, OSF intended to strike a distribution among the selected countries on the following factors: geography, language, population size, degree to which civic space is closed, political system and economic development level (GDP).

Within these 30 countries, a total of 1229 youth organizations were documented by the partner organizations, of which 479 were interviewed. Given challenges faced with securing on-the-ground support in Sudan and South Sudan, we were unable to include data from these countries.

Materials and Collection Procedure: A questionnaire containing 46 questions, 18 of which were coded quantitatively, was developed by the partner organizations. The questionnaire was administered by local consultants engaged by the partner organizations to each youth organization via a representative selected by the organization itself. Questionnaires were either administered in person and entered on paper, or administered by phone and entered directly into Excel form.

Information gathered via questionnaire was supplemented with a desk review of available academic literature, media publications, youth organizations' self-published materials, and social media postings on youth social organizations in Africa.

Analysis: Quantitative data was consolidated and cleaned. Variables representing some aspect of youth organization success (e.g., membership numbers, annual budget) were paired with variables representing youth organization internal structure (e.g., age of representatives, gender balance of leadership team) and external conditions (e.g., local internet usage, repressive government policies) to check for significant relationships. Qualitative data was sifted through to search for trends in youth organizations' general behaviour, ideologies and planning.

THE MAKE-UP OF YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

This section explores the profile of youth organizations — their age, gender balance, legal status, and the sectors they operate in.

Age

As explained in the introduction, 2010 marked the beginning of a surge of youth organizations in Africa due to a variety of factors that have led to increased civic engagement. These organizations are thus young as entities themselves. We further expected, and found, that these entities are run and represented by youth. 75% of our sample's representatives were aged 35 or younger, while 15% were aged 25 or younger. Moreover, 16% of representatives under the age of 35 identified as active founding members of the organizations they represented.

Figure 1

Regarding the age of the organizations themselves, 60% of our sampled organizations had emerged over the course of the last ten years, while 29% of organizations have been active for under 3 years. Youth groups from the South of the continent were by far the youngest, being on average only 4.5 years old, while groups across all regions were 9.0 years old on average.

Amongst our sample, there was a connection between the age of organizations' representatives and their financial stability, or ability to access the funds it needs. It was found that 72.5% of youth-led organizations (with representatives under the age of 35) identify as having low financial stability.

These young organization leaders hold a variety of positions - as critical and diverse as their older counterparts. From founders, to presidents to members of the board of directors, they assume positions at every level of management. They also intervene

Figure 2

in multiple aspects of management, e.g., administration, communications, finance, external relations, program development, research, etc.

Gender

There have been significant investments and intentionality around increasing women and girls' empowerment through national and international meetings (conferences, forums), conventions and legislations (Niang and Ba, 1998/99). Though our study is not capable of qualifying the success of such projects, we can address the current representation and treatment of women/girls within our sample.

Age and Sex of Survey Respondants

Figure 3

As can be seen in Fig. 3, women are underrepresented as youth organization representatives, and presumably similarly underrepresented in leadership/management positions. Women are most represented at a slightly lower age (approximately 25) than men (approximately 33), indicating the possibility that the next generation of female leaders will be larger than the last. Nonetheless, without a sudden and large influx of female administrators in their early to mid-twenties, it appears unlikely that the quantity of women will match that of men in the rising generation of youth organization leaders.

With regards to women as beneficiaries of youth organizations, it is noted that the second most common denomination of intended beneficiaries, after youth, were Women and Girls, with 16% of organizations listing them as direct (but not necessarily sole) beneficiaries of their work .

Registration and Opportunity

Registration status varies widely between organizations, as well as between regions. 81% of national Youth Organizations listed in this study were legally registered, while 13% have either no legal status or are pending registrations (the remaining organizations having not specified). However, this varies widely from one country to another – some having most of their organizations legally registered while other countries have very few, if any at all.

One possible explanation for this is the lack of legislation recognizing youth organizations in certain regions. It is the case in Egypt where all youth organizations are not legally recognized by authorities [c.f., Case Study no. 4]. In instances where national legal recognition is low for youth organizations, it is typically due to slow bureaucracies and complex procedures extending delays of registration from several months to multiple years, before


Figure 4

the issuing of a document recognizing the applicant. Similar cases occurred in Gabon, Burkina Faso and Senegal.

This situation creates vulnerability for youth organizations in these regions: they can be hindered at the administrative level. Some of the major hurdles facing organizations with no legal status revolve around their ability to secure support from international granting organizations or even for them to effectively integrate networks. The same applies to their ability to receive authorizations from authorities with regards to organizing and publicizing activities.

In some rare instances, there are countries where the entirety of national Youth Organizations listed in this study benefit from legal recognition. This is the case in Ghana, where all Youth Organizations listed are legally recognized, as well as in Cape Verde, where more than 90 % are recognized. In these countries, organizations have an official status, which gives them an advantage in terms of access to funding, and of overall perceived legitimacy in their actions.

It should be noted, however, that there was very little diversity in the total number of unregistered youth organizations by country. The number in each country that we sampled was between only 0 and 8 (with Botswana, the single outlier, having 15 unregistered organizations).

Sectors of Action and Common Concerns

The sectors in which our sampled youth organizations operate are diverse and address a very broad spectrum of issues while engaging multiple stakeholders and beneficiaries. This includes, but isn't limited to, the following sectors: environment, health, social, economy, politics, culture, and religion. The following serve as some examples of youth organizations focused on such sectors.

Politics: The African National Congress Youth League, an offshoot of the African National Congress of South Africa, was founded after World War II. It has since then served as a conduit for youth to the ANC, South Africa's governing political party. The ANC Youth League espouses similar aims to its parent group, expressed broadly as the promotion of a national consciousness and African Nationalism.

Health: The Amani Initiative, based in Arua, Uganda, aims to create, in their own words, "sustainable solutions to teenage pregnancy and early marriage through the direct involvement of the community." Noting that 47% of the Ugandan population is below the age of 15 and that the current incidence of teenage pregnancy in Uganda is 24%, the representatives of the Amani Initiative conclude that millions of Ugandan girls are at risk of having their educations and professional development interrupted by unwanted marriage and/or pregnancy. They note, additionally, that the children of young women are expected to suffer poorer health than children of more mature women. [www.amaniinitiative.org for more information]

Economy: The #HelpMeFindWork movement, based in Maseru, Lesotho, was co-founded by Tsólo 'Tjeka Tjeka' Thakeli out of frustration in not being able to find work after having graduated with a degree in law. The movement aims to push the government of Lesotho to pledge to create 50, 000 jobs for youth and jobless graduates, as well as to develop a strategy for combating nepotism. The movement organizers hope to see the unemployment rate cut in half by June 2019.


Figure 5

Case Study no. 1: La Lucha, in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Founded in 2012, La Lucha is a youth organization that breaks with the typical model of youth organizations in the DRC. A non-violent, independent and non-politically aligned organization, La Lucha works on social issues such as unemployment, water, teacher bonuses, electricity, etc. It seeks to raise awareness and mobilize young citizens in particular, but also to influence the decisions and behaviour of state authorities in the DRC.

The organization is structured in five sections, each with a specific mission. For example, the communication unit is responsible for defining the organization's communication strategy, while the documentation unit is responsible for all documents on members' actions, for keeping minutes of meetings and the photographic database, and for managing books that may be of interest to members.

The organization deliberately eschews legal recognition, and does not have a central office. According to a study published by Protection Internationale, this refusal bolsters the organization in two recognizable ways: First, it protects the organization from infiltration and attempts at manipulation by the authorities. Second, the informal nature of the organization allows it to engage in sabotage practices without the authorities having any opportunity to prove their involvement, or to prevent such practices in advance. This status becomes a source of vulnerability when, e.g., seeking authorization to demonstrate on Congolese territory. Members of La Lucha have repeatedly been arrested during their demonstrations, which are criminalized.

In short, La Lucha has opted for a model of horizontal organization, without hierarchy between members, without legal recognition, but rather with cells at different levels in order to guarantee their survival, dynamism and freedom of organization.

TYPES AND FORMS OF MODERN AFRICAN YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

How have Youth Organizations Evolved?

Describing the evolution of social youth organizations in Africa poses a rather complex and difficult problem. It requires knowledge of the transformations of these organizations over time and of the differences in these transformations by region. The analysis of such a dynamic requires tracking of each youth organization over time, and collecting data on a broad array of factors. This is further complicated by the changing landscape in which these organizations are born and thrive; since these organizations are dynamic responses to current social issues, we must describe their changing context in order to describe their evolution.

Case Study no. 2: The evolution of a youth organization in Senegal

The June 23rd organization (or M23) is a youth organization born of a wave of protest in early 2010 in Senegal. The environment at the time was dominated by political frustrations, precipitated by consolidation of power by then-president Abdoulaye Wade and his recently publicized intention to run for a third term in office. The M23 organization, in its early stages, made a series of demands to the government of the time: withdrawal of then-president Wade's candidacy for a third presidential term, withdrawal of a bill creating a new vice-president position in Senegal, depoliticization of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, and entrusting presidential elections to an independent third party, among others. M23 thus defined itself as a political organization highly critical of the current regime, but which was not originally explicitly supportive of any recognized opposition group. Their vision and demands thus did not fit neatly into the existing political spectrum.

M23 continued to grow over the next year and, leading up to the election of 2012, became increasingly disruptive to state authorities in particular. Following the election of 2012 and the successful stymying of Wade's candidacy, however, the organization began to be characterized by larger divisions[1].Some accounted for this change by referring to the manipulation or "corruption" of the organization's leaders. Internal conflicts eventually led to the birth of the Cos M23 organization, which was composed primarily of young people who were originally members of M23.

How are Youth Organizations Structured?

The youth entities which we surveyed fell roughly into two different organizational structures: entities which arose organically and which were scaffolded and given structure after the fact, and entities which arose artificially, with organizational structure already in place.

Organic: The movements emerging from Egypt during the Arab Spring serve as archetypal examples, as they were broad, decentralized and organically-arising revolts among youth. The revolt fractured into several distinct organizations over the subsequent three-year period. Some of these organizations developed unofficial internal leadership only after particular members distinguished themselves as spokespeople; other organizations did not develop a leadership structure at all [c.f. Case Study no. 4].
　　Other organically emerging entities, such as Y'en A Marre in Senegal, engage a non-hierarchical model of different sub-entities in different regions of their home country. These entities have an autonomous cell in each region so that national coordination is ensured by an office in which each region is represented. Though this model can be understood as a kind of mobilization strategy for better national coverage, it also helps to avoid any attempt to misuse the organization's objective by outside forces or even members of the organization's own leadership. Other entities still prioritize autonomy and financial independence by refusing subsidies from their local governments. According to the national coordinator of Y'en A Marre, "when an organization depends exclusively on the authorities, it is at their mercy. It will be dictated and manipulated whether it likes it or not because, as a Wolof proverb says, whoever gives you an eye decides what you look at." La Lucha, in the DRC, has a comparable structure (c.f., Case Study 1).

Artificial: These entities are the aforementioned NGOs and NPOs — organizations with centralized leadership, founding documents, and top-down direction.

HOW YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS NAVIGATE WITHIN OR DESPITE CONTEXT

This section explores the legal and political conditions promoting and inhibiting the functioning of youth organizations.

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[1] C.f. "La batail de l'opposition au sein du M23", http://ekladata.com/SxeebG3nr4G4TmOeGuupEAg4YEI.pdf

Interaction of Youth Organizations with Governments

In our research, we have observed that government sanctioned support for youth entities differs by sector. Governments seem much more likely to commit resources to entities with which they are already ideologically aligned. The examples par excellence are entities which operate in health or economic sectors. Dedicated funding and opportunities abound for entities dedicated to increasing employment among youth. According to the International Labour Organization, which conducted a cartographic study in 2011, 80% of youth employment initiatives across the continent were, at least in part, funded by national governments (ILO, 2012).

By comparison, there is a notable lack of dedicated funding and opportunity for entities engaged in overtly counter-cultural or political efforts. Examples include LGBT entities (c.f., Case Study 3) and regime-critical entities (c.f. Case Study no. 4). Beyond a lack of funding, youth entities may struggle against legislation which targets their activities more directly. In Uganda, for example, 7 members of the youth wing of the Democratic Alliance organization were arrested in 2015 under the authority of the repressive Public Order Management Act (Amnesty International, 2015).

Of course, exceptions still do exist; governments may act in concert with youth entities on political issues which are not felt to be threatening to the state. One example is the recent legislation in Nigeria to lower age requirements to run for public office ("Buhari Signs Not Too Young to Run Bill into Law", The Guardian).

Case Study no. 3: LGBT Organizations

Repression of LGBT identified individuals has an extensive history in post-colonial Africa. Homosexual activity is illegal in the majority of countries across the continent, with penalties ranging up to life in prison and death (Sudan, Mauritania) (Carroll). At present, South Africa is the only country in mainland Africa to have legalized gay marriage (with the exception of colonial Spanish outposts in the northwest of the continent) (Carroll).

Some countries have legislation which targets LGBT groups explicitly. Nigeria, for example, passed the Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act in 2013, which threatens a sentence of 10 years imprisonment for anyone "forming, operating, or supporting gay clubs, societies and organizations" ("Tell Me Where I Can Be Safe", Human Rights Watch). As expected, youth entities that work on behalf of LGBT rights are often clandestine and have few options or opportunities for developing their internal organizational structure, or open relationships with governments and potential funders. The risk of being "outed" as gay in many areas of Africa is lethal, as has been illustrated in Africa multiple times — for example, with the murder of Sierra Leonean LGBT activist FannyAnn Eddy in 2004, the murder of 9 gay men at a gay massage parlour in Cape Town in 2003, the beating of 14 men suspected of being gay in 2014 in Abuja, Nigeria, and the murder of Ugandan gay rights activist David Kato in 2011 only 6 months after being "outed' by a local newspaper (BBC, Gettleman, "Tell Me Where I Can Be Safe", Human Rights Watch).

Many LGBT youth groups have taken advantage of the anonymity of social media, hosting open but anonymous groups or pages primarily on Facebook. Where LGBT youth groups are able to operate openly, they may be forced to seek funding exclusively from NGOs or foreign governments. This is the case with the organization Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), which has had an antagonistic relationship with the homophobic Zimbabwean government of former prime minister, Robert Mugabe. GALZ has thus received its funding from, among others, the development organization Hivos (Netherlands), the South African Aids Trust (South Africa), and Out in Tech (U.S.A.) (Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe).

Interaction of Youth Organizations with Non-Government Organizations

In this section, we attempt to measure the interactions and relationships between social movements in Africa and non-governmental organizations. In the available literature, the question of interactions

between NGOs and youth entities is very poorly addressed. Thus, our main referent for this section is qualitative data from focus group discussions conducted among members of our sample.

For most of the youth entities mapped, collaborating with NGOs is a requirement for survival or, at the least, a stable source of aid. To better illustrate this dynamic, we quote directly from some of the focus groups:

> "*In Zimbabwe, it is generally accepted that you cannot survive alone as a youth movement. You need the support of other like-minded organizations to coordinate your activities together and achieve a more effective and efficient response. In addition, working with NGOs and other organizations allows you to identify your weaknesses and the limits of your methods in your community intervention strategy.*" (Zimbabwe focus group);

> "*The overall objective of collaboration is to use the opportunities offered by partnerships, knowledge sharing, learning and exchange of skills trainers.*" (Uganda focus group);

> "*Partnerships aim to share ideas and resources, build capacity and share knowledge and good practices; reduce fragmentation and build a strong dynamic.*" (Ghana focus group);

> "*The overall objective of this collaboration is to promote human rights and strengthen the effective organization of civil society in the country. This has helped us to carry out joint advocacy actions for youth development.*" (Sierra Leone focus group).

Some youth entities also benefit from financing and financial and technical support from non-governmental organizations. Examples of NGOs with large funding programs include, but are not limited to: The African Development Bank and African Development Fund (AFDB/ADF), the African Union, the Commonwealth Youth Program of Africa (CYP), the Commonwealth Foundation, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), and the International Organization of Francophonie in Africa (OIF).

However, it must be noted that relationships between NGOs and youth entities can become antagonistic where their interests do not align. Some of the youth entities in our sample have noted that, after collaborating with a large NGO, their actions become restricted and their partner organization begins taking credit for their achievements. This explains why some entities refuse external support and prefer to work alone (e.g. LUCHA in the DRC, Nittu Deug or Tout va Mal in Senegal).

The Effect of Legislation

Since the end of the 2000s, Youth Organizations have been evolving in a context marked by a gap between the expectations of populations (especially young people) and the promises and actions of national government authorities. Recently, however, a number of governments, including Burkina Faso, Senegal, the Gambia, Gabon, and Cameroon, have made efforts in the direction of inclusive legislation (Charte Africaine de la Jeunesse, 2006; Déclaration de Ouagadougou des Mouvements Citoyens Africains, 2015).

The enactment of these laws stands to benefit youth organizations greatly. Among the organizations covered by the study, 66% said they benefit from laws promoting the smooth running of their activities as well as their development while 33 % indicated that their countries either had no supporting legislation or, to the contrary, had legislation which limited their endeavours, restricting their evolution.

Figure 6

The following legislations serve as examples: the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information Public Protection Act (AIPPA) in Zimbabwe; the law on Public Order Management or Child rights and re-entry policy in Uganda (Amnesty International, 2015).


Figure 7

Figure 8 shows the distribution of restrictive legislation in each region. In the northern part of Africa (Egypt and Morocco), restricting legal instruments are more common. The situation is different in Central Africa (Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) where youth organizations tend to benefit from legislation aligning with the nature of their actions.

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Figure 8

legislations can have impact on a variety of aspects related to a organization's ability to function well and effect change. For example, restricting legislation can lead to difficulty accessing funding (c.f. Case Study no. 3).

Historical Context

African states have highly variable histories and cultures of protest and youth organization. Some organizations are positively enabled by the stronger commitment of, and support from, young people due to an overall strong culture of activism related to the national history (e.g., South Africa, where the African National Congress Youth League has been active since 1944).

However, in countries like Cameroon, Guinea Bissau, and Algeria, civic organizations are repressed by government, especially when they are focused on public affairs. In recent years, there have been several cases of hindrance of Youth Organizations through the systematic ban of marches/demonstrations. This has been the case in Algeria since June 2001, when the government issued a ban on public demonstrations in the capital, Alger ("Algeria: Labor Protests Forcibly Dispersed", Human Rights Watch). This constitutes a violation of fundamental rights: march/demonstration, and in a broader sense, freedom of expression.

CAPACITY AND RESOURCES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Financial Support and Stability

Figure 9 shows that 41 % of youth groups have an annual budget lower or equal to 1 000 USD - with 17% operating with no budget at all - while only 19 % of youth groups have a budget higher than 50 000 USD. Organizations in our sample also broadly demonstrated a relationship between the age of their representatives and their financial stability (c.f., The Makeup of Youth Organizations: Age).

Figure 9

Furthermore, our results show that groups are most likely to feel insecure about their source(s) of funding in Northern and Southern regions, and least likely to feel funding insecurity in the Western region. The implication is that either (a) the youth groups from Western, and to a lesser extent Central and Eastern regions, have a more comfortable financial support source relative to their needs, or (b) groups from Western, Central, and Eastern regions have more tolerance for financial risk (Figure 10).

While the impact of limited funding has many repercussions for activities organizations will be able to carry out, another key aspect it influences, administratively, is the ability to adequately staff projects. This would explain the high number of organizations that rely solely on volunteer work or who have no permanent staff, approximately 23% of our sampled entities.

Figure 10

Access to funding mainly depends on the organization's financiers – the types and number of funders, as well as their overall diversity. When the majority of the budget comes from the group's own funds or from public funds, the annual budget is more likely to be low. When private funds and economic partners support the organization, the budget tends to be higher. Below are the indicative examples of Niger, Cape Verde and South Africa.

Figure 11

In Niger, the budget of organizations mainly comes from three sources: private entities, public entities, and member contributions. Member contributions account for 63 % of youth organizations funds and 60 % of organizations have a budget lower or equal to 1 000 USD. This indicates a correlation between the size of the budget and its sources.

Figure 12

Unlike Niger, budget sources for organizations in Cape Verde are more diverse (average of four different sources). Nevertheless, the correlation is the same in the two countries: when the government and member contributions are the main sources for the budget (58 % for both sources), it does not exceed 10 000 USD. Approximately 57 % of organizations have a budget lower or equal to 1 000 USD. For the rest of the organizations, it varies between 1 000 and 10 000 USD.


Figure 13

The situation in South Africa is different from the situation in Niger and Cape Verde because of the higher budgets of youth organizations in the region. The level of private funding and funding coming from economic partners is higher in South Africa, where 53% of national youth organizations have a budget higher than 50 000 USD. Economic partners' contributions account for an average of 11 % of budgets.

Entities which have "no strings attached" financial support (financial support without specific implementation requirements) are especially less vulnerable than entities receiving restricted funding.

Entities receiving restricted funding must often rely on member contributions for all-purpose liquidity to support operations. Such restrictions can have an impact on entities' reach results. 21% of the organizations relying on restricted sources of funding cannot mobilize more than 100 people at the national level.

While the source and nature of funding greatly affect an organization's financial stability and viability, they not the only factor of influence . For instance, as part of the focus group discussions conducted for this study, it was noted by multiple organizations in Ghana and Nigeria that a particular challenge in securing funding came from "Donor Fatigue" — that is, a decrease of public interest in responding to calls to action or for funding.

Engaging and Influencing: How Organizations Communicate with their Audiences

In the 21st century, digital platforms have emerged as a strategy for publicizing social change. They give organizations more broad and frequent access to the populations which they serve by delivering news and developments directly, without a traditional media intermediary. This can foment rapid growth, which can in turn lead to global resonance and a critical mass in the group's size, as was the case with the Arab Spring (Tine and Elhaou, 2015: 71) (c.f., Case Study no. 4).

As part of this study, all organizations were asked to share the social media platforms they use as well as their preferred media channels, both traditional and digital, for diffusing information and connecting with their stakeholders. 100% of entities that answered this question reported using digital platforms (email, mobile, social media) as one of their main ways of communicating.


Figure 14

The most popular means of communications for youth organizations is Social Media, with 76% of organizations listing it as one of their primary (but not necessarily exclusive) means of communication, followed by 68% using mobile/telephone communication (through Whatsapp and text messaging), and 54% using email. While multiple Social Media platforms and websites are used by many youth

organizations, the most common remain Facebook and Twitter, followed to a lesser extent by Linkedin, Instagram and Youtube.

The reasons that motivate an organization's choice of the channels of communication vary and are tied to context, audiences and resources. For example, in Equatorial Guinea, organizations surveyed indicated that, due to the geographical context and to the overall low internet penetration rate in the country, the population had limited access to internet. Thus groups in Equatorial Guinea favour the use of mobile technologies as one of the main means of communication. Another example is that of Zimbabwe, where the government's reluctance toward harbouring youth organizations and repression of protests has youth organizations relying on social media and word-of-mouth — mediums with which the government cannot as easily interfere. The use of hashtags by youth entities was marked, with, for example, #WearLocalFridays and #helpmefindwork in taking hold in Lesotho and with #TropCestTrop by Maison des Jeunes in Bamako to advance the rights of marginalized groups.

The widespread use of social media-based communication has perhaps been reinforced by the internet becoming increasingly accessible throughout the continent. Between January 2017 and January 2018, the number of internet users registered a growth of 20% - over the same period, there was an increase of 12% in social media subscriptions, namely on Facebook. These results are closely linked with the use of mobile phones. It must be noted, however, that this data varies from one region to another with Southern Africa being the region with the highest internet access penetration rate at 51%, followed closely by North Africa with 49% and by West Africa with 39%. The intensity of this growth represents a significant opportunity for youth organizations; if seized, it can amount to effective and broader communication of their activities and strategies (Kandem, 2018).

Our results indicate that, among all regions, groups from the North have significantly larger online followings, with an average of approximately 30,000 online members/followers. Groups from other regions, by comparison, have closer to 7500 online followers on average. It must be noted that these results are sensitive to overstatement and/or overestimation by groups, as well as outliers.

Case Study no. 4: The Arab Spring in Egypt

The available literature regarding the history of the Arab Spring is divided into two main schools of thought concerning the event's main drivers. The first school of thought focuses on the well-documented political and economic frustrations throughout the Maghreb region at the time. The second school of thought focuses on the catalysing role of social media, which granted the uprisings an accelerated growth and reach.

From the former point of view, the root of the Arab spring was a long-term social frustration that finally broke to the surface in 2010 (Ferjani and Matteral, 2011). It was by putting forward relatable social demands that the revolt eventually ousted former presidents Zine el Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

From the latter point of view, it is through the catalysing effects of social networks and communication technology that the organizations born of the revolt persisted. According to Castells (2002), social media offered previously unavailable opportunities for organization, expression and commitment. This position seems to posit that for the liberation of an oppressed society or young population, it is enough to give them free access to the Internet. This is why Tine and Elhaou (2015) argue that IT companies will eventually not only be considered providers of information and communication service, but also of "expressiveness", "engagement" and even capitalization of relationships through the creation of a virtual community and the dissemination of information.

The first explanation is more generally applicable as a theory to support the tracking of youth organizations and uprisings on the African continent. Analysts in Senegal, for example, have shown that youth organizations have emerged as a result of a series of factors: repeated power cuts, rising food prices, flooding, unemployment (Dalberto, 2011; Tine and Elhaou, 2015), and corruption, financial and real estate scandals (Cissokho and Sidy, 2011). The second explanation would suggest, on the other hand, that to successfully predict and track youth organizations and uprisings throughout Africa, much greater attention must be paid to the availability and use of internet-based communication technology among African youth.

JOINING FORCES: HOW YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS COLLABORATE AND WORK WITHIN NETWORKS

Relationships Between Organizations

Youth entities in our sample were asked two questions regarding their relationships with other youth entities:

1. Are you part of a network?
2. If yes, who else is in the network?

61 % of our sample were members of networks. Our data shows, provisionally, that the likelihood of a youth organization being part of a network is less determined by *who* they are and more determined by *where* they are. To illustrate, we have found that the age of organizations' representatives is not a factor in the likelihood that a group will identify as part of a network. The country of origin of an organization, however, is a large determinant, as will be shown below.

Connections Between Youth Organizations Across Africa

Legend
- Botswana
- Uganda
- *United
- Nigeria
- Tanzania
- Malawi
- Egypt
- Senegal
- Morocco
- Liberia
- *South
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
- Seychelles
- Ghana
- Benin
- Ethiopia
- *Guinea
- Kenya

Figure 15

The analysis of the listing of partners generated a map which captures 1555 entities and 1 894 connections (c.f., Figure 15). The networks represented in Figure 15 are at the national level (each organization representing a network of relationships within a country). However, Figure 15 does not provide a measure of the complexity and intensity of the relationships that take place for each organization or in each country. Figure 16 provides better insight into what the connections in a given country, in this case Nigeria, looks like.

Youth organization representatives have clarified through focus group discussions that these networks exist for multiple purposes — for entities to partner and collaborate for the sustainability of initiatives, to share events and relevant administrative and legislative documents, to share experiences between countries (best practices and challenges faced), to build a global network and to promote youth leadership, etc.

Connections Between Youth Organizations Across Nigeria

Figure 16

Interconnectedness by Country and Region

With regards to a organization's ability to collaborate with other organizations, there are large variations from one country to another which covary with our index of Youth Vulnerability[2].

Figures 17 and 18 shows the similar situations of Equatorial Guinea and Lesotho. Both countries demonstrate few connections between organizations, as well as higher youth vulnerability than overall vulnerability. In countries with such characteristics, the possibilities for collaborations within a greater network may be limited.

Equatorial Guinea

Figure 17

Lesotho

Figure 18

In contrast, in countries such as Nigeria we can see connections within and between entities are more frequent. Nigeria is one of the countries with a general level of vulnerability higher than the level of youth vulnerability. Freedom of expression and reunion is well established in the country. Although the country

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[2] Youth Vulnerability, as employed here, measures the social, economic, and political pressures in African countries overall, and specifically as related to youth. Examples of key indicators for measuring youth vulnerability are as follows; Employment/Opportunity, Health/Wellbeing, Political Participation as well as Education.

has very high levels of insecurity, corruption and partisanship, young people are very active when it comes to public matters.

Nigeria

Figure 19

Larger regions in Africa also display certain particularities in the manner of their interconnectedness, as seen in the maps below. The two most highly-saturated regions, West Africa and Southern Africa, are particularly notable for their differences. The former consists of webs of indiscriminate connection, while the latter operates on a "hub-and-spoke" model, with many "spoke" entities coalescing around a single "hub" organization. The danger of the hub-and-spoke structure to individual organizations is that hub-like entities may begin to act as bottlenecks on the communication between entities. The safest model of connection is in fact an indiscriminate web of connection between all entities, as exemplified in West Africa. In such a model, an organization does not risk being isolated by the loss of its "hub" or "parent" organization.

Connections Between Youth Organizations Across West Africa

**Connections Between Youth Organizations Across Central Africa**

Figure 20

Figure 21

**Connections Between Youth Organizations Across Southern Africa**

**Connections Between Youth Organizations Across East Africa**

Figure 22

Figure 23

**Connections Between Youth Organizations Across North Africa**

Figure 24

CONCLUSION

This study summarizes the current context of youth organizations across 30 African countries. It provides a snapshot of their realities while also considering the promise they hold for a better future. Mostly made by youth and for youth, these organizations take different shapes and formats and cover a variety of sectors. They form and act in response to community problems and development gaps, but they also act as tools for questioning power and raising the accountability of governments and public institutions. Despite the relevance and legitimacy of their actions and the overall impact of their activism, youth organizations face significant barriers and obstacles.

The findings of this study constitute an opportunity for OSF and other organizations to reflect on how to strengthen the capacity of youth organizations and intentionally craft the way forward for youth activism. Below is a list of recommendations with this goal-set in mind. It is important to note that while recommendations have been organized based on the target group they are aimed at, they should not be perceived as limited only for those groups/organizations to address.

Recommendations for Open Society Foundations

1. Expand access to the online youth movement platform to convene and facilitate exchanges between youth organizations of experience, expertise and data. The platform should be public and user friendly (with user training provided as necessary) and should include an updatable directory of youth organizations.
2. Provide support, both financial and technical, aimed at building and/or increasing the capacity of youth organizations to conduct large-scale programs, initiatives and events.
3. Reinforce the capacities youth organizations by developing curriculum and offering training - in the form of coaching, mentoring or educational opportunities - on best practices around good governance, leadership, fundraising, finance, accounting, and monitoring & evaluation.

Recommendations for National Governments, International Institutions

1. Reinforce the capacity of youth organizations by offering tailored training at the national level to youth organizations. Said training should cover monitoring, evaluation, learning and accountability. This could be supported by, for instance, National Youth Councils.
2. Conduct further research on youth organization activities in order to understand their vulnerabilities, their competencies and the impact of their activity. This information would help identify gaps and priorities around policies, legislation and other support needed.
3. Create mechanisms to facilitate the recognition of youth organizations and reduce restrictive legislation. International organizations and institutions can play a facilitating role by assisting in crafting favourable policies for youth organizations in Africa. They can also act as safeguards with regards to the existing and agreed upon policies of which governments are signatories, particularly for organizations that face administrative or legislative obstacles in their home country.
4. Create specific funding opportunities for youth organizations which are unable to cooperate with governments in their home country.
5. Involve youth organizations as credible actors in the field of community development. This includes involving and crediting them at all levels – design, implementation and monitoring of programs, projects and actions.
6. Reduce economic and social vulnerability of youth organizations by providing funding and support relevant to the scope and intended impact of their programs and activities. Where possible, reduce administrative obstacles faced by youth organizations for accessing funds.

Recommendations for Youth Organizations

1. Create national networks of youth organizations which contribute and engage at the continental level by organizing fora, seminars and conferences. Such networks and events would ideally act as a channel for sharing experience and expertise between otherwise disconnected organizations.
2. Support women's involvement in youth activism in Africa, building on the work of existing efforts, agreements and conventions aimed at increasing women's participation and inclusion in community development.
3. Develop strategies for accessing the financial and technical support of international institutions and governments. This could be done in collaboration with governments through National Youth Councils, when applicable.

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF COUNTRIES MAPPED

Algeria
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Egypt
Ethiopie
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzanie
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

While Sudan and South Sudan were originally selected, due to difficulties encountered at the implementation phase of the project, we were unable to survey Youth Organizations in both countries.

APPENDIX B: BroadImpact Consulting – OSF Africa Youth Activism Online Platform

BroadImpact's Profile

BroadImpact is a development and business management advisory and consulting firm with expertise in strategy development, assessments, evaluations, youth and women's empowerment, programs, logistics and supply chain management, health systems strengthening, quality improvement and innovative technology solutions for health, education and agriculture.

Registered and operating in Nigeria (CAC RC 1351314) and Zambia (CR Number 120170001671) as independent 100% African owned local consulting organizations, BroadImpact implements projects with a view of the local context and with good understanding of the needs of the African beneficiaries, the local culture, and terrain in African countries.

BroadImpact engages teams of experienced local and international personnel and consultants- building capacity of local experts while providing the highest quality of professional services and program implementation for the development and business needs in Africa.

With strong expertise evaluating programs, capacity building, implementing youth, and women's sexual rights and women's economic empowerment programs, BroadImpact has undertaken assignments in 14 countries in Africa working for a number of local and international organizations such as the Tabitha Cumi Women's Foundation, Open Society Foundations (OSF), UNICEF, UN Women, and Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI).

Youth Platform Development Background
As part of the mapping of youth movements in 30 African countries, an interactive online platform and dashboard was developed by BroadImpact Consulting. The online platform was designed to receive data uploads on youth movements, provide basic visual details of each youth movement and data export functions. The platform was used to collect and aggregate all information and data collected from youth group administered questionnaires, focus group discussions and other responses by all partners during the youth mapping process.

Description of the Youth Platform

Purpose of the Youth Platform
The platform was designed for the following:
- Collect and aggregate all information and data collected from youth group administered questionnaires, focus group discussions and other responses by all partners during the youth mapping process.
- Provide a Dashboard with basic information of youth movements in Africa e.g name, location, scope, no of organizations etc
- Generated quantitative indicators based on data collected in Charts and Maps that are exportable.
- Provide a portal that can be updated and viewed by the youth groups, regional bodies, researchers and others.

Basic Portal Requirements
- Data visualization using Map of Africa. Choose an African country and display indicators, we might require delve down by one level; Continent > Country > *Type.
- Content management /Data Entry Module; Manual /via MS Excel - to provide Indicators/calculations). Optional over an API from a third-party application e.g. ODK.
- Data and visuals will exportable as PDF, PNG and .XML
- Role based access control. We advise a max of 5 roles

Key Features on the Portal
1. **Data Collection –** The portal was designed to receive and aggregate uploads of youth group basic information on a youth directory, survey questionnaire, focus group discussion mapped per country and region.
2. **Generation of Youth Survey Indicators** such as Survey Numbers, Age of Respondent, Date of Establishment, Number of Employees, Operating Environment, Partners and interaction, Social Media and Operations can be view per Country with multiple country options.
3. **Infographics –** Generation of tables, charts and listings based on data entries on the portal.
4. **Export of Youth Data –** The export of raw data, listing and charts in different formats- excel, pdf
5. **Cross Platform language compatibility**- The portal supports a toggle between English and French language for the dashboard visuals.
6. **Access Control**- Providing control and access for different users with different roles.
7. **Search function**- Allowing youth groups to be searched for listing by group name.
8. **Country Vulnerability Index (CVI)-** Computing country vulnerability index using a series of results.

Accessing the Youth Platform
The url of the Youth platform is www.africayouthactivism.org .
For best performance, we advise that access of the portal is done via Mozilla Firefox. Login is done via partner registered accounts.

Login Portal

Role of Users on the platform

The role types created on the platform are categorized under the following headings:

Super Admin	Has all privileges.
Editors	Editors can View, Edit, Delete Data and Visualize reports
Data Manager	The Data Manager can View, Edit and Delete Data.
Guest	Guests can only view charts and Dashboard
Partners	Partners can perform all functions on the portal except Editing and Deleting users.

The Data Entry/Upload Process

Youths groups were first registered on the portal based on location, then youth data was entered into excel youth directories, questionnaire entry sheets and focus group entry sheets, and uploaded on the platform via direct input on the application (where you type into the database) or via spreadsheet entry sheets upload (Excel).

Three data sheets and databases are maintained by the platform as follows:

- **Youth directories** - Capture basis descriptive listing of youth groups and basic information – name, location, email, telephone number, focus, scope.
- **Youth Questionnaire-** Capture quantitative and qualitative responses from administered questionnaire to youth movements
- **Focus Group Discussions-** Capture focus group discussion summaries

Alternative manual data upload mechanism was designed on the platform to allow direct input on the application (where you type into the database) or via spreadsheet upload (Excel). "Create mapping data" function for direct application entry and upload mapping data for spreadsheet upload

After creating the organization information on the portal, Youth data can be viewed, listed, updated, exported as required. In addition, the portal uses a combination of the results to compute and generate the Country Vulnerability Index (CVI)

Dashboard Configuration
The portal has in-built Dashboard that shows a Tree Map Chart and Map of Africa with the No of Youth Group mapped in each country. Also, an information bar to search for youth groups registered on the portal.

Youth Geo-Mapping
Map of Africa with youth groups by country displaying number of youth movements per country listed in the portal. Clicking n country map expands to provide country specific listing of youth groups.

Map of Africa showing youth movements

Information Search Bar for searching youth movements

Tree Chart showing the number of Youth Groups listed in portal

Indicator Chart Generator: Based on data uploaded, and indicators listed the portal generator, country indicator charts by survey numbers, Movements date of establishment, number of employees, operating environment, operations, partner interaction and social media information. These charts can be exported in different formats- pdf, jpeg etc

Data Indicator Chart Generator

Country

Malawi

Indicator

Survey Numbers
Age of Respondent
Date Of Establishment
Number of Employees
Operating Environment
Operations
Partners and interaction
Social Media

Country

Zambia ×   Seychelles ×
Uganda ×

Indicator

Age of Respondent

Filter

Recommendations for the Youth Platform

- Create link to portal from OSFs website with a brief write up on the youth platform.
- Presentation/Demo of youth platform - use, benefits and features to regional bodies or youth conferences for youth groups.
- Provide training and user manuals for regional youth bodies and groups.
- Provide access to directory section of directory section of platform for research on youth groups in Africa by scholars or youth champions. OSF or AU regulating body controlling access and providing parameters for access. Only descriptive group information to be shared- Group Name, location, focus, leadership, contact details etc
- Provide access for routine updates by country youth groups directly or AU country youth chairperson with an OSF admin or by OSF team. Eg Addition of new youth groups. This can be open throughout the year or annually within a window.
- Annual review and expansion of capabilities and features of platform annually based on increase of youth groups uploaded.

APPENDIX C: Integrated Contextual Youth Assessment: Methodology and Guidance Note

The Integrated Contextual Youth Assessment, which is an analysis of the operating environment of youth movements across Africa, uses a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative data. The methodology rests on three principal pillars as seen in the graphic below: the Country Vulnerability Index (CVI), the Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA), and Key Informant Interviews (KII), each of which are covered in greater detail below. The methodological foundation for all three pillars is discussed, as is the role that each plays in the larger integrated methodology. Additionally, this technical information is supplemented with analysis and narrative to illustrate how the methodology works in practice and, broadly speaking, the type of information and insights that it can offer.

- Quantitative snapshot of structural pressures and vulnerabilities
- Should be used as a foundation to inform subsequent inquiry

Country Vulnerability Index

Stakeholder Network Analysis

- Identify leverage points, spheres of influence, social capital
- Assess gaps in the network that should be filled
- Should be used to help optimize the impact of activities

- Should be used to validate quantitative findings, fill gaps, and add context
- Can gather information not captured through the CVI or SNA

Key Informant Interviews

Country Vulnerability Index

The purpose of the Country Vulnerability Index (CVI) is to provide a snapshot of structural vulnerabilities and pressures within and between Africa's 54 countries. The Index offers this snapshot both for each country as a whole and for how these vulnerabilities and pressures affect youth specifically. It provides a quantitative baseline to help analysts prioritize, undertake further research on, and monitor specific geographic or thematic areas. Because the context of each country is unique, the CVI is not meant to be interpreted solely, or even primarily, through a look at the headline numbers, but is instead intended to provide a necessary standardized baseline and framework for comparative and deeper analysis. This includes the role that the CVI can play in highlighting both concerns and areas of success that may fly under the radar. It also includes the potential role in identifying countries that are faced with parallel or analogous environments at a broad level, which can be useful for exploring whether there are transferable lessons or strategies. Finally, if the CVI is updated annually it can serve to clarify how vulnerabilities and pressures change over time, nationally, regionally, and continent-wide.

The construction and use of a quantitative index like the CVI are not meant to lessen or ignore the important role of qualitative inquiry but is simply premised on the idea that all qualitative interpretation should flow from an initial quantitative foundation to minimize the distortionary effects of group-think, personal unconscious bias, or undue weighting of the most recent or most accessible events and information. The CVI provides this type of foundation, but rigorous analysis must build on top of it using additional research tools such as stakeholder network analysis, key informant interviews, additional research, as well as the expertise and personal knowledge of the analyst. These additional tools can provide context to the scores from the CVI and help elucidate how those scores manifest on the ground.

Of course, any index does present inherent limitations. These occur both at the level of the index structure itself (which presupposes a level of generalizability and an implicit method of integration) and at the level of data (each quantitative source has its own emphasis or methodological characteristics and there can be gaps in time and space that must be accounted for). The importance and relevance of these limitations necessarily will vary from index to index depending on how it is constructed. For example, an index of indices, like the CVI, will have fewer gaps, but the emphasis and methodological characteristics of the component indices will take on greater weight. These limitations can be mitigated to a degree by not relying solely on headline numbers and instead by disaggregating the index components, but they cannot be completely eliminated. However, if both the strengths and limitations of the CVI are transparent and fully sensitized among its key users, it can be successfully employed in its role as a quantitative foundation for more informed, strategic, and targeted analysis.

Stakeholder Network Analysis

The purpose of a **stakeholder network analysis** (SNA) is to provide analysts with a better understanding of the organizations working on youth issues across Africa and how those organizations are connected, both to each other and to organizations that are geographically or thematically separate. Through the use of a visualization and analysis platform such as Kumu, an SNA can identify important characteristics of the network of organizations working on youth issues and can also help inform program design. At the most basic, an SNA can help locations that are well covered by a large number of organizations working

on youth issues and where there may be gaps with few such organizations. Even where there are a large number of organizations, however, they might be siloed, working largely in isolation or with a small number of partners. Visualizing the network can illustrate where this occurs, thereby helping to identify where information and best practices are unlikely to flow effectively between members of the network. Additionally, if there is additional information collected from each organization – such as their area of focus – then this information could also be visualized, helping to illustrate where there may be thematic gaps across any given geographic level.

Platforms like Kumu also offer more advanced social network analysis tools to identify key organizations within the broader network using measures of centrality. These measures can be calculated for the entire network or for a subset of the network, such as for a specific country. Three such measures that are particularly useful are Betweenness, Reach, and Eigenvector. Organizations with high **Betweenness** are the brokers or bottlenecks, often lying on the shortest, most direct path between other organizations. This positioning makes them effective Conveners, but if not leveraged well, can also be a bottleneck, inasmuch as they are uniquely positioned to connect different branches of the network. **Reach** is perhaps the most intuitive understanding of centrality; this value measures the proportion of the network that lies within two steps of a given organization. Organizations with high reach are often well placed to serve as Communicators since they are positioned in such a way as to rapidly disseminate information to a large number of organizations. Organizations with high **Eigenvector**, may or may not have high Reach and Betweenness but they are well connected to other organizations that are well connected to the broader network. As such they are positioned to be the Implementers. In the context of this network analysis, this position is often filled by organizations that work in multiple different countries; they are often connected to the leading organizations in each country where they work.

There are two key limitations inherent in stakeholder network analysis: 1) capturing changes over time, and 2) accounting for response rate bias. The first limitation is based on the fact that the network map is constructed at a moment in time, and thus may fail to capture new connections or organizations while continuing to include outdated information. This type of risk can be mitigated by sending periodic inquiries, either to all stakeholders or to a random sample of them, in order to update the data that underpins the stakeholder network. The second type of limitation occurs when organizations in some geographic or thematic areas are disproportionately likely to be missed and therefore excluded from the stakeholder map. This is especially prone to arise when the authors of the map have stronger knowledge of or familiarity with certain areas. It can be minimized by using as comprehensive an initial list of relevant organizations as possible and iteratively sending out the scoping survey to organizations identified by previous respondents as partners.

Two examples illustrate the value of integrating Stakeholder Network Analysis as an integral part of the analysis of youth movements across Africa. The first is Nigeria (in orange, left), in which youth organizations operate on a hub-and-spoke model, in which a small number of hub organizations each connect to a large number of spoke organizations. The spokes are typically only connected to a single hub, and the hubs have a few links between themselves and to the wider network of organizations working on youth issues in Africa. A visualization of this pattern from Kumu, with the Nigerian-based organizations in orange, is on the left. This model is one in which betweenness is particularly important. Hubs operate as key brokers and bottlenecks, not only to the spokes to which they are connected but also to each other. Thus, it is these hubs that are crucial to investigate in more detail to understand how information flows, or fails to flow, amongst organizations working on youth issues in Nigeria.

The second example – a comparison of Mozambique (in yellow) and Lesotho (in blue) – demonstrates how SNA can add meaning and understanding to the Country Vulnerability Index. The two countries have very similar scores for youth vulnerability in the area of political participation, suggesting that the environment in which youth organizations operate in the two countries shares important similarities. At first glance, the SNA confirms this suggestion, as both countries have a similar number of youth organizations located in the country. However, many of the organizations in Mozambique are closely connected to one another, as seen on the right, although they are not well connected to the wider network of youth organizations operating in Africa. The organizations in Lesotho, on the other hand, are almost entirely isolated and disconnected, as seen on the left. Thus, information and best practices will be much more likely to flow between organizations in Mozambique but highly unlikely to effectively do so in Lesotho. This suggests that introducing best practices or new skills might be a valuable use of resources in Mozambique, but that those same resources might be better spent on improving the connections between organizations working on youth issues in Lesotho. Additionally, it might be valuable to try to determine whether there is an underlying reason why organizations in Mozambique are so much better connected than those in Lesotho.

Comparing patterns of connectivity in the various regions in Africa
When disaggregated by region the main takeaways were that Central Africa (ECCAS countries) had the least number of organizations networks, while West Africa (ECOWAS) had the highest.

- West Africa (ECOWAS): 446 Organizations; OSIWA had the highest level of Betweenness
- Central Africa (ECCAS): 70 Organizations; Etudiants Musulmans du Gabon had the highest level of Betweenness
- Southern Africa (SADC): 456 Organizations; ActionAid had the highest level of Betweenness
- East Africa (IGAD): 153 Organizations; Uganda Youth Network had the highest level of Betweenness
- North Africa (AMU + Egypt): 136 Organizations; Info-Com Jeunes de Guelma had the highest level of Betweenness

West Africa (Economic Community of West African States)

Central Africa (Economic Community of Central African States)

Southern Africa (SADC)

East Africa (IGAD)

North Africa (AMU + Egypt)

At the country level, the SNA shows that some countries have denser connections than others, for example Botswana and Malawi in Southern Africa, Uganda and Tanzania in East Africa, and Nigeria in West Africa.

While some networks are thick and multilateral suggesting high social capital to be leveraged, it is often the case that networks tend to be more of a hub-and-spoke model, where a small number of hub organizations (conveners) each connect to a large number of spoke organizations. Countries with more of a hub-and-spoke model are Cameroun in Central Africa, South Africa and Malawi in Southern Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Sierra Leone in West Africa and Algeria, Egypt and Morocco in North Africa. The disadvantage to this pattern is that particular hubs can act as bottle necks, as much as they may otherwise act as brokers, suggesting that in such cases, OSF should encourage them to be more inclusive, while also supporting platforms that will optimize more connections between the spokes.

Relationship between Connectivity and the Operating Environments in which Youth Movements Work
Data collected during this research suggests that countries with a more conducive operating environment, as reflected in the CVI, tend to have more connectedness as reflected in the SNA.
The Stakeholder Network Analysis (SNA) utilized four key metrics to identify organizations that are most connected across the Youth Movements mapped; these are betweenness, reach, degree centrality and eigenvector.

Organizations with high **Betweenness** (which measures the shortest, most direct path between other organization) should be leveraged by OSF as Conveners. These are organizations that bridge different branches of the network. Examples of organizations with high betweenness are BudgIT in Nigeria, Uganda Youth Network in Uganda, Pillar of Hope Organization in Botswana and Paradigm Initiative in Nigeria. One of the most apparent common denominators within the countries in which these organizations operate is that they all register low scores within the Politics and Governance in the overall Country Vulnerability Index as well as political participation indicators in the Youth Specific Country Vulnerability Index (CVI). In other words, these countries are highly resilient in terms of youth participation in politics and governance. For example, Botswana which is one of the countries with a dense network of connections registered one of the lowest scores as it concerns youth involvement in politics and governance (1.37 and 1.56 respectively), closely followed by Uganda and Nigeria with 4.90 and 6.53 in politics and governance; and 1.36 and 2.52 in youth political participation respectively.

Organizations with high **Reach** should be leveraged by OSF as Communicators. This metric measures the proportion of the network that lies within two steps of a given organization and, as such, are well positioned to rapidly transmit information across a large number of organizations. Three organizations were also found to have high reach in the SNA; they are Uganda Youth Network in Uganda, AIESEC in Malawi and Network for Youth in Sierra Leone. The countries of Uganda, Malawi and Sierra Leone also register a high degree of resilience in the youth political participation and politics and governance indicators in the CVI.

Organizations with high **Eigenvector** should be leveraged by OSF as Implementers. These are those organizations that are well connected to other organizations that are well connected to the broader network but may not have such far reaching connections themselves. This position is often filled by organizations that work in multiple different countries; they are often connected to the leading organizations in each country where they work but less well connected to the numerous smaller players. For example, out of the top 20 organizations with a high level of eigenvector in the SNA, 18 of them are

based out of Botswana. In the earlier paragraphs we have highlighted how organizations in Botswana have a dense web of connections and this is moderately correlated to the opening up of the political space both in terms of politics and governance and youth participation in politics as indicated in the CVI. It may be interesting for further research purposes to identify why a lot of organizations in Botswana have a high Eigenvector.

Degree centrality is the simplest of the centrality metrics, counting the number of connections an element has. In general, elements with high degree are the local connectors / hubs but aren't necessarily the best connected to the wider network. In other words, organizations with high degree centrality have the highest number of connections to other organizations. Examples of organizations with degree centrality are Paradigm Initiative in Nigeria (28 connections) African Union Youth Clubs in Botswana (25), Maestros Leadership Organization, Botswana (25), Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA), Nigeria (21), Okoa Mtaa Foundation in Tanzania (20) and Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY) with 16 connections to mention a few. What is immediately apparent in these examples is that the organizations mentioned above are located within countries that are highly resilient in politics and governance as well as youth political participation as indicated in the CVI. For instance, Tanzania (3.21 and 3.33) and Liberia (5.03 and 1.72) both have low scores as far as those two indicators are concerned. The inference that can be drawn from this is that organizations tend to connect well in countries where the political space is opened up as opposed to being restricted.

Countries with the greatest number of connected organizations are thriving hubs for participation in politics and governance
Taking a look at a combination of data in both the SNA and CVI, there is a correlation between well connected organizations and countries where the civic space has improved. This is particularly significant as it regards the level of involvement in politics and governance by both youth movements and other organizations in the countries concerned. For instance, taking a look at countries like Tanzania, Nigeria, Botswana, Liberia and Malawi, it is evident that the level of connectivity of youth movements is far impressive than what obtains in other African countries. It is also significant that these countries tend to do well in particular indicators of participation in politics and governance as highlighted in the CVI. The inference that can be drawn here is that there is a relationship between the level of connectedness of youth movements and countries where its citizenry is allowed to participate in politics and governance with little or no restrictions.

Key Informant Interviews

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), conducted with prominent individuals with expertise or visibility on a specific issue, serve to contextualize, qualify, and expand upon the findings from the Country Vulnerability Index and the Stakeholder Network Analysis. For example, KIIs can help elucidate how the vulnerabilities and pressures identified in the Country Vulnerability Index are expressed in the lived experience of youth and the broader society. They can also provide information on sub-national and local dynamics and how broad structural factors manifest differently, or to a greater or lesser degree, within different parts of a country or region. KIIs can also help highlight issues, challenges, and successes that the quantitative data is not capturing, either because the data is missing or because they are poorly conveyed through the structure of the Index. For Stakeholder Network Analysis, KIIs can draw out greater detail and nuance than the map can provide. This detail might include:

- How well information flows or how successful collaboration is along the linkages in the network
- Whether organizations with high betweenness are functioning as brokers or bottlenecks
- Whether some links are stronger or weaker

- What kind of relationship exists between the bigger players and the smaller players that may be closer to the ground
- Other questions as driven by need and context

KIIs are also useful for gathering information that is not captured by the Country Vulnerability Index or the Stakeholder Network Analysis. This encompasses data that cannot be well summarized in a quantitative form, such as legal frameworks, as well as information that is governed through informal understandings, such as social norms, motivations, and beliefs of community members. A few examples of specific questions that have been asked along these lines that yielded information that could be useful in designing programs to support youth organizations include:

- What communication platforms are popular or frequently employed
- What relevant policies/legislation exists and how it affects day-to-day operations
- How outside organizations can best be supportive

Given the differences between the expertise and perspective of the interviewees, the questions that are asked during the KIIs should be open-ended to provide for the opportunity for the interviewee to give rich answers. At the same time, the interview process should be guided by the information gained through the Country Vulnerability Index and the Stakeholder Network Analysis, as well as through other previous research and expertise on the part of the analyst.

Relationship between connectivity and impact

Although the information gained from KIIs can sometimes be uneven, the responses from the Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA) and BudgIT, two organizations based in Nigeria, illustrate the way rich narrative can give a fuller picture of the situation. The availability of that kind of finer-grained detail can then inform the design and implementation of OSF programs to ensure that they are more reflective of the local context. Both of these organizations have achieved successes in recent years and both have high degrees of centrality within the broader network, albeit on different measures. As illustrated in the beginning of this note, the KIIs play an important role in both validating previous findings – e.g. the important enabling role of a relatively open operating environment and of strategic partnerships with other organizations – and filling gaps and adding context not captured by the CVI and SNA, e.g. the type of activities that organizations find most effective and how success can beget success.

The Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA) is an organization in Nigeria that has been hugely instrumental to widening up of the political space for young people to run for office in Nigerian elections. Prior to its work with the "not too young to run" bill young people in Nigeria have often been restricted by the constitution and other statutes regarding their ability to run for any office in the country. The constitution and other acts had specified an age limit for running in specific high offices in Nigeria. YIAGA's advocacy which involved a mass mobilization of both online and offline resources to engage lawmakers at the National Assembly and the 36 state legislatures in the country to acquiesce to the passage of the bill which also required some tweaking in the constitutional provisions as regarding age limit for running for office.

According to Samson Itodo, convener of the "not too young to run" movement organised by YIAGA, "Our approach to power and power dynamics contributed in no small measure to the success of our struggle against inequality and gerontocracy. We approach Power as a relationship rather than a status. As a movement, we organised around two forms of power: "power with" and "power over." In such cases, we have to organise our power with others first to claim the resources or decisions that will fulfil our interests."

Through interdependent collaboration, the "not too young to run" movement created strategic partnerships with several organizations and stakeholders from different aspects of human endeavour like civil society, trade unions, professional associations, faith-based and community organization etc. Media groups like Channels Television, African Independent Television (AIT), TV Continental, Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Premium Times, Sahara Reporters, The Cable and YNAIJA played a key role in public sensitization and agenda setting. They also through a collaborative effort organised series of public demonstrations, advocacy visits, town hall meetings, and public debates to push the campaign. When the Senate and House committee allegedly killed the bill, it took the collaborative power of different actors for it to be rescued.

As a movement, they also organised to challenge *'power over'* held by decision-makers in the constitution review process. They include; Senate President and Speaker of House of Representatives; Deputy Senate President and Deputy Speaker who act as chairs of constitution review committees; 46 members of Senate committee on constitution review and 47 in the House; Senators and Honourable members; Speakers and members of State Assemblies. The movement also engaged four categories of influencers – leadership of political parties, traditional/religious leaders, godfathers and drafters and consultants to the committee on constitution review.

All of these efforts resulted in the shattering of the glass ceiling for youths in Nigeria. For the first time since 1999 young people could contest or run for any political position, they desired without restrictions placed on their age. Presently, Nigeria has over 20 Presidential candidates for the 2019 February elections and a substantial number of them are young people. A remarkable feat championed by the "not too young to run" movement of YIAGA.

BudgIT, also based in Nigeria, is another example of a highly connected organization with a degree of impact. This organization focuses on providing access to public income and expenditure figures. A lot of BudgIT's work is done online where they grant access to the public, details of fiscal documents like state and federal government budgets, debt profile and revenue generating profile of states and the federal government to mention a few. BudgIT's work also involves tracking of what has become known as "constituency projects"; a rather opaque system of project implementation by the legislatures in the Nigerian National Assembly. Significantly also, BudgIT's advocacy work has catalysed mass dissatisfaction and pressure on the National Assembly to make public their monthly and annual incomes. In June 2018, for the first time Nigerians were made aware of the huge monthly incomes of its national legislators which amounts to almost the highest in the world. All of these were achieved because of the advocacy work of BudgIT. Finally, based on the access granted by BudgIT, a lot of other organizations in Nigeria have significantly identified advocacy strategies to promote transparency in public expenditure and revenue.

Components of the Country Vulnerability Index

National Level	Indicator	Source	Measurement
Economics Score	Economic Decline	Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace	Public finances, unemployment, GDP, inflation, FDI, poverty
	Sustainable Economic Opportunity	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Public management, business environment, infrastructure, and the rural sector
Public Services and Welfare Score	Public Services	Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace	Policing, education, health, internet & communications, water & sanitation, electricity
	Human Development	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Welfare, education, health
Politics-Governance Score	State Legitimacy	Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace	Representative government, corruption, civil/political liberties
	Participation and Human Rights	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Participation, rights, gender
	Well-functioning Government	Positive Peace Index, Institute for Economics and Peace	Public and civil services, trust and participation, political stability, rule of law
Safety and Security Score	Security Apparatus	Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace	Armed conflict, terrorism, coups, crime
	Societal Safety and Security	Global Peace Index, Institute for Economics and Peace	Crime, displaced people, terrorism, policing, political stability, political violence, violent protests
	Personal Safety	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Personal safety, policing, social unrest, crime, political violence, human trafficking
	National Security	Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Armed conflict, displaced people, cross-border tensions, violence by non-state actors

Youth Level	Source	Measurement
Employment and Opportunity Score	Global Youth Development Index, The Commonwealth	Unemployment, fertility, financial inclusion

Health and Well-being Score		Physical and mental health, alcohol and drug abuse, HIV rate, well-being
Education Score		Education, internet use
Political Participation Score		National youth policy, voter education, expression of political views